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Unfinished Business
For many Britons, June promises to be a month of 
reflection on a distant war over a tiny cluster of 
islands in the south Atlantic. No doubt the 
merchandisers of public consciousness will be 
reaping lucrative financial rewards as the public 
commemorates the 10th anniversary of the Argentine 
garrison's surrender. But as Britain focuses on 
mythical glories and neatly packaged television 
dramatisations of the war, few appear to realise that 
the real conflict is far from over.
Diplomats from both sides of the At­
lantic will be hammering out deals 
over the future of the Falldands/Mal- 
vinas. Despite some 1,000 deaths in 
1982, there are still many outstanding 
issues.
Perhaps coincidentally, June also 
marks the next round of Anglo-Argen­
tine talks on economic co-operation 
over the islands, with particular refer­
ence to oil exploration and exploita­
tion. Although earlier discussions 
faltered in February, both sides will be 
back at the negotiating table because 
there is already too much at stake to 
allow the new rapprochement to col­
lapse.
No one knows exactly how much oil 
exists in the vicinity of the islands, as 
seismic surveys in the area are only 
just beginning. However, some es­
timates, including one by the US 
government, suggest that reserves 
around the Falklands/Malvinas could 
be as significant as those in the North 
Sea. Ironically, Britain may need Ar­
gentine labour, equipment, and in­
frastructure to exploit any such 
reserves. In exchange, Argentina will 
almost certainly push for an agree­
ment that would allow Argentine 
companies to operate in island waters 
from which they are presently ex­
cluded.
Co-operation with Argentina is also 
driven by the need for joint regulation 
to protect fisheries around the 
Falklands/Malvinas. The islands' 
economy has become far more de­
pendent on fishing since the war, espe­
cially as a result of the Shackleton 
Report.
Building on a report he wrote in 1976, 
Lord Shackleton concluded that the 
economy of the islands was extremely
fragile, mainly due to its over-depend- 
ence on wool farming. He recom­
mended the creation of the Falklands 
Islands Development Corporation 
(FIDC), which was given an initial 
five-year budgetof about £31 million, 
to encourage diversification into 
enterprises such as fishing.
However, due to mismanagement by 
the FIDC, and the 1987 collapse of the 
FIDC-sponsored Stanley Fisheries, 
very little fishing is now conducted by 
the islanders themselves. Instead, the 
islands' administration prefers to 
make uncomplicated profits from the 
granting of squid and other fishing 
licences. Nonetheless, the fact that the 
fish stocks cross existing territorial 
limits has propelled the need for an 
understanding with Buenos Aires on 
the prevention of overfishing.
But the new rapprochement between 
London and Buenos Aires is still 
fragile, especially on the taboo topic of 
sovereignty. Although Argentina and 
Britain agreed not to formally discuss 
sovereignty in 1989 in order to get on 
with economic talks, sovereignty will 
continue to intrude on any negotia­
tions. In part, this is because any dis­
cussion over oil or other marine 
resources will tend to impinge upon 
notions of sovereignty and its relation 
to claims on territorial waters.
While the dispute over who 
legitimately owns the islands seems 
unlikely to be resolved in the near fu­
ture, it is nonetheless central to the 
posturing of both governments. Both 
are gambling that future develop­
ments will tip the situation in their 
favour.
Britain is content to discuss economic 
co-operation, not only for the obvious 
financial benefits to be obtained from
any future agreements, but also be­
cause it expects that Argentina's need 
for foreign capital makes it particular­
ly vulnerable to economic influence. It 
believes that Argentina can be stalled 
indefinitely on the question of 
sovereignty, especially once it is tied 
into a series of co-operative 
enterprises.
Argentina is prepared to play a cool, 
waiting game. It is gambling that co­
operation will soften the attitudes of 
both the London and Port Stanley ad­
ministrations towards their former 
enemy, and that eventually 
sovereignty will be returned to Argen­
tina. But Britain and Argentina cannot 
both be right.
By agreeing to pursue economic 
agreements with Britain without 
securing any concession that 
sovereignty will even be discussed, 
Argentine president, Carlos Menem, 
may have unwittingly ensured the 
conditions that will keep the is­
landers where they are. As HughO'- 
Shaughnessy of the London Observer 
recently pointed out, the 'kelpers', as 
they refer to themselves, may become 
the richest community in the western 
hemisphere if oil is found around fhe 
islands.
Nevertheless, Argentina seems con­
tent not to push too hard on 
sovereignty: President Menem is 
clearly more interested in cash than 
real estate, at least for the time being. 
For him, the overriding imperative is 
the success of his economic reforms, 
and the survival of his government, 
both of which are dependent on large 
capital investments, especially from 
abroad. An important part of this has 
been securing buyers for major state 
enterprises such as the national 
telephone company and Aerolineas 
Argentinas. Future sales of state- 
owned utilities, such as electricity and 
gas companies, are on the cards.
Here the connection with Britain is an 
interesting one, as illustrated by Ar­
gentine Foreign Minister Guido di 
Tella's visit to the UK in April 1991. 
Ostensibly, Mr di Telia went to seek 
'advice' on appropriate regulatory 
mechanisms as Argentina moves 
towards a more liberal economy.
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Britain may have lost an Empire - but at least it found the Falkland Islands.
However, Mr di Tella's discussions 
with British giants ICI and Baring 
Brothers suggest that he may also 
have been looking for buyers for fur­
ther rounds of public company sell- 
offs-
Without wishing to oversimplify the 
complex issue of sovereignty, a couple 
of simple observations on the impasse 
can be made. Firstly, Argentina claims 
that the Falklands/Malvinas rightful­
ly belong to it, based on inheritance of 
the islands from Spain. Argentina's 
possession was interrupted when its 
outpost on the islands was forcibly 
removed in 1833. It has protested 
against Britain's occupation ever 
since.
Secondly, Britain, which in the late 
1960s and 1970s contemplated giving 
die islands back, now insists that it 
will not discuss sovereignty. It main­
tains that the wishes of the islanders, 
who are of British stock, must be 
paramount in any negotiation over the 
future of the islands. Given the express 
and unsurprising preference of the is­
landers to remain British, this is mere­
ly another way of saying that 
sovereignty is not negotiable.
Despite a cosy commitment to 
dialogue, there are compelling 
reasons why neither side can budge on 
sovereignty. For Argentina, the 
islands' significance as a political sym­
bol of first world arrogance and im­
punity, and their corresponding 
importance in Argentine political cul­
ture, would make it political suicide 
for any government to give them 
away.
For Britain, the islands and those who 
currently inhabit them have also been 
an important icon. Former Prime Min­
ister Margaret Thatcher's commit­
ment to preserve the islanders' way of 
life has been taken up by her successor, 
John Major. This is backed by a bi-par­
tisan consensus which is almost un­
paralleled in any other area of British 
political life. As in Argentina, public 
Passions over the islands run high. 
The existence of a £276 million 
^ilitary base on the islands, and a gar­
rison of over 2,000 British personnel, 
stands as testimony that the war is not 
pver. With nearly one soldier for every 
‘slander, the 'kelpers' are probably the 
^ost heavily defended community 
^ywhere in the world.
£s an editorial in the British paper, the 
Guardian, suggested in January, the
anniversary "is not dry history dead 
on the page. It is also a reminder of 
wholly unfinished business; for the 
Falklands crisis is not dead, but mere­
ly slumbering". This is not to say that 
Argentina will ever invade the islands 
again. The Watergate-like crisis of Ar- 
entine national institutions sparked 
y defeat in 1982 means that any fu­
ture government will find it very dif­
ficult to mobilise support for another 
militarist venture. However, future 
Argentine governments may not be as 
sympathetic to negotiation, or quite so 
keen to cultivate close ties with the 
Western alliance, as that of Mr Menem. 
Potential Argentine aggression is 
probably less of a threat to the 'kelper' 
way of life than a stagnant economy 
and the vagaries of world commodity 
prices. The islands' economy still 
relies heavily on wool, despite at­
tempts at diversification. In fact, most 
of the wool farmers on the island are 
afloat only due to the influx of cash in 
the form of direct assistance and sub­
sidies.
While the selling of fishing licences, 
mainly for squid, has generated new
income, this may not be sustainable 
given current rates of overfishing. Due 
to the squid's one-year life cycle, squid 
stocks are incredibly fragile: overfish­
ing one year can create disaster the 
next. In the meantime, negotiations to 
create a common regulatory 
framework to protect such maritime 
resources in the south Atlantic are 
stalled by the impasse on sovereignty.
Unless the question of sovereignty can 
be resolved in a way which satisfies 
political and economic interests on 
both sides, the situation will continue 
to be a volatile one.
The discovery of oil might be enough 
to raise tensions once again in the 
south Atlantic. Argentina is presently 
committed to dialogue because it sees 
some opportunity for gain from 
economic co-operation. But if the dis­
covery of oil turns the islands into a 
mini-Kuwait, unless some compensa­
tion is offered Argentina might feel 
compelled once again to pursue its 
sovereignty claim with more vigour.
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